Abstract. The notion of key privacy for asymmetric encryption schemes was formally dened by Bellare, Boldyreva, Desai and Pointcheval in 2001: it states that an eavesdropper in possession of a ciphertext is not able to tell which specic key, out of a set of known public keys, is the one under which the ciphertext was created. Since anonymity can be misused by dishonest users, some situations could require a tracing authority capable of revoking key privacy when illegal behavior is detected. Prior works on traceable anonymous encryption miss a critical point: an encryption scheme may produce a covert channel which malicious users can use to communicate illegally using ciphertexts that trace back to nobody or, even worse, to some honest user. In this paper, we examine subliminal channels in the context of traceable anonymous encryption and we introduce a new primitive termed mediated traceable anonymous encryption that provides condentiality and anonymity while preventing malicious users to embed subliminal messages in ciphertexts. In our model, all ciphertexts pass through a mediator (or possibly several successive mediators) and our goal is to design protocols where the absence of covert channels is guaranteed as long as the mediator is honest, while semantic security and key privacy hold even if the mediator is dishonest. We give security denitions for this new primitive and constructions meeting the formalized requirements. Our generic construction is fairly ecient, with ciphertexts that have logarithmic size in the number of group members, while preventing collusions. The security analysis requires classical complexity assumptions in the standard model.
Introduction
Motivation. The notion of key privacy for (asymmetric) encryption schemes was formally dened by Bellare, Boldyreva, Desai and Pointcheval [2] . The motivation for this security notion is anonymous communication, where eavesdroppers are prevented from learning the identities of the communicating parties, and namely the target recipient of a ciphertext. Since people are more and more concerned about all their actions being linkable to each other (or even worse, to their identity), key privacy is obviously a very attractive notion from the user's point of view. However, some organizations and governments are concerned about how anonymity can be abused by criminals, and the key privacy property can potentially be dangerous against public safety. Therefore anonymity revocation should be available when illegal behavior is detected, as provided by group signatures [9] .
This motivates the notion of traceable anonymous encryption in which an adversary cannot determine which user's public key has been used to generate the ciphertext that it sees while a trusted third party (given some trapdoor information) is able to revoke anonymity and thus to trace back to the intended recipient. Some work dealt with such a property, but to the best of our knowledge, a critical point was missed: an encryption scheme may contain a steganographic channel (or a covert channel) which malicious users can use to communicate illegally using ciphertexts that trace back to nobody, or even worse to some honest user. More precisely, still using the ocial scheme, it may be possible to encrypt a message to a user A (the ocial target recipient for the tracing authority) so that the randomness is used for transmitting some extra information to a user B, that would not be traced as a possible recipient.
For instance, in 2007, Kiayias, Tsiounis and Yung [17] presented group encryption, a cryptographic primitive which can be seen as the encryption analogue of a group signature [9] . It provides semantic security, anonymity and a way for the group manager to revoke anonymity of ciphertexts. However, it makes use of zero-knowledge proofs to determine whether a ciphertext is valid or not. As a consequence, an invalid ciphertext can be used to transmit some information. Above all, subliminal channels (available in the randomness) can be exploited to send some information in addition to a clean message, or even to frame an honest user.
3. the ciphertext remains condential and anonymous even with respect to the mediator (i.e. we only rely on the mediator to guarantee the absence of covert channels in ciphertexts, by properly rerandomizing the ciphertexts), or any collusion of users and the mediator. As already said, multiple re-randomizations are even possible by various independent mediators.
We propose ecient constructions of Mtaes in the standard model, which security relies on DDH-like assumptions. The rst one does not split the roles of the issuer and the opener and can be applied in any group where the DDH assumption holds while the second scheme makes use of (Type-2 or Type-3 [13] ) pairing-friendly groups, with asymmetric pairing where the XDH and the (asymmetric 1 ) DBDH assumptions hold, to separate the two authority roles (and then achieve the second above property). The two rst schemes lead to ciphertexts that are linear in the number of registered users. This is not very practical, but they are fully-collusion secure. Using public collusion-secure codes (e.g. IPP codes [16] ), better eciency can be achieved: we provide a generic construction, with (almost) logarithmic ciphertexts. 2 Security Model
Syntactic Denitions
In this section, we give the formal denitions of our new concept: the Mediated Traceable Anonymous Encryption, which involves two trusted authorities, an issuer for adding new members to the system, and an opener for revoking anonymity; and a non-trusted authority, the mediator that systematically re-randomizes all its inputs, without any private information. There even can be several independent mediators. Mediators will be assumed to be honest (but possibly curious, and thus denitely not trusted): for the subliminal-channel freeness security notion we will dene later, it is clear that in case of collusion with the last mediator, this strong security level cannot be achieved.
Denition 1 (Mediated Traceable Anonymous Encryption Schemes). A Mtaes is a tuple of
ecient algorithms or protocols (GSetup, Join, Encrypt, ReRand, Decrypt, Trace, Judge) such that:
GSetup(λ) → (mpk, msk, sk O ): this is a randomized algorithm run by a trusted party that, on input of a security parameter λ, produces three keys consisting of a group public key mpk, a manager's secret key msk and an opening key sk O ; It also generates a data structure L, called a registration list which is initially empty.
Join(id, mpk, msk) → (pk id , sk id ) takes a bit-string identity id, the group public key mpk and the manager's secret key msk as inputs. It outputs a pair of member keys (pk id , sk id ) associated to id, and updates the registration list L with the pair (id, pk id ).
Encrypt(mpk, pk id , m) → C takes as input the group public key mpk, a user public key pk id and a message m, and outputs a pre-ciphertext C. ReRand(mpk, C) → C takes as input the group public key mpk and a pre-ciphertext C, and outputs a randomized ciphertext C . Note that it may be applied again on a re-randomized ciphertext.
Decrypt(mpk, sk id , C) → m takes as input the group public key mpk, a member secret key sk id , as well as a ciphertext C, then it outputs a message, or ⊥ in case of invalid ciphertext.
This is a deterministic algorithm that on input the group public key mpk, the opening key sk O , the registration list L and a ciphertext C, outputs a user identity id (equivalently, the public key pk) and a proof Π for the judge, otherwise ⊥ in case of failure.
Judge(mpk, L, C, id, Π): This is a deterministic algorithm that on input the group public key mpk, the registration list L, a ciphertext in C, a user identity id and a proof Π checks whether Π indeed proves that id is the target recipient of the ciphertext C (or one of them, in case of collusion).
Random tapes have been omitted in the notations, for the sake of clarity, but in some cases, they may be explicit: Join(id, mpk, msk; r), Encrypt(mpk, pk id , m; r) or ReRand(mpk, C; r).
Security Notions
In any group protocol, where each user owns a private key, collusions have to be dealt with: a collusion of users may help them to manufacture a new pair (pk, sk) associated to no user, or to an honest user. The latter case should be unlikely. The tracing algorithm should thus (in case the ciphertext "contains" some information) either output the identity of the target receiver if this is a well-formed ciphertext to this user, or the identity of one of the colluders who helped to manufacture the target public key. If the pre-ciphertext does not target any public key (nobody can be traced) then we want the re-randomization to cancel any information. Collusion will be modeled by corrupt queries, that will provide the secret keys of the corrupted users to the adversary. Then, from all these keys, the adversary will be allowed to do anything it wants to transfer some information, in an untraceable way. As a consequence, in the security model we provide the adversary with two oracles: a restricted Join oracle (denoted Join * ) that just outputs the public keys, and a Corrupt oracle that outputs the user's secret key. Corrupted users are then registered in the corruption list C, initially empty:
Join * (id) → pk id , takes as input an identity, and then runs Join(id, mpk, msk) to get (pk id , sk id ), but outputs pk id only. Note that the registration list L has been updated by the Join procedure;
Corrupt(id) → sk id takes as input a registered identity, and outputs the secret key corresponding to pk id . It also updates the corruption list C with (id, sk id ).
We then denote by LU the list of registered identities, and by CU the list of the corrupted users, whereas L and C also contain keys. We additionally dene a predicate Traceable(U, C), where U is a list of identities and C a pre-ciphertext, that tests whether the tracing algorithm, run on the global parameters and a re-randomization of C, outputs an identity id ∈ U with a convincing proof Π.
Since we are dealing with anonymity and traceability, we should address full-anonymity and chosenciphertext security, providing access to the opening oracle and to the decryption oracle respectively. But due to the inherent malleability of such a re-randomizable encryption scheme, some constraints are required. This is discussed in the Appendix A. In this section, we focus on the basic anonymity (without opening oracle access) and the chosen-plaintext security (without decryption oracle access).
In order to avoid the opener to frame an honest user, as the recipient of a ciphertext that is not aimed to him, we can rely on an additional Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), in which each user owns a pair of public/private key, and signs pk id when it receives the associated secret key sk id . This signature can be added to the registration list L. We thus trust the link between an identity id and the associated public key. And we will use both in an indierentiable way.
Semantic Security. The main security notion for an encryption scheme is of course the semantic security of the ciphertext (after re-randomization), that is formalized by the indistinguishability of the two experiments (for b = 0, 1) presented Fig. 1(a) . As usual, the adversary has to guess which plaintext has been encrypted in the challenge ciphertext. Note that we provide the opening key sk O to the adversary, which models a collusion with the opener. We restrict the adversary to use a valid (registered) public key, since otherwise no one can decrypt the ciphertext. We are thus only interested in the privacy of real ciphertexts. We dene the advantage of A in breaking the semantic security by its advantage:
We dene a weaker version, where the opening key is not provided to the adversary (which is useful when we cannot separate the issuing and opening/tracing roles, as in our rst simple scheme below): As usual, we denote by Adv Mtaes (λ, τ ), for any security notion, the best advantage any adversary can get within time τ . Furthermore, we may add an extra parameter ω, when we limit the number of Corruptqueries. This will be useful for schemes that are not fully-collusion secure (see Section 4), but ω-resilient: the security holds if the number of Corrupt-queries is less than ω. The above security notion is about the re-randomized ciphertext, and thus for an adversary that does not have access to the pre-ciphertext before re-randomization. We thus dene the same security notion about the pre-ciphertext characterized by the advantages Adv Anonymity. Our goal in this work is anonymity of the recipient (a.k.a. key privacy [2] ), we formalize it as usual by the indistinguishability of the two experiments presented Fig. 1(b) : the adversary has to guess which public key has been used to generate the challenge ciphertext. Again, we restrict the adversary to use valid (registered) public keys. We dene the advantage of A in breaking the anonymity (after re-randomization or before) by:
Theorem 3. For any scheme Mtaes and any time bound τ , Adv
Correctness. Of course, an encryption scheme that is non-decryptable could be secure (semantically secure and anonymous). We thus need the scheme to be both decryptable and traceable: a well-formed ciphertext should be decryptable by the target recipient (using sk associated to the target pk, both generated by the Join oracle), and should be traced (with high probability) to this recipient by the opener. No adversary should be able to win the correctness game (see Fig. 1 (c)) with signicant advantage:
Subliminal-Channel Freeness. Let us remind that our ultimate goal is that either the ciphertext can be traced to a corrupted user (under the control of the adversary), or the adversary cannot transfer any information. This is modeled by the subliminal-channel freeness property (see Fig. 1(d) ): the adversary generates two pre-ciphertexts C 0 and C 1 , with which it tries to transmit some information. If they are well-formed, and really trace to corrupted users, then this is normal that the information is transferred and so the adversary does not win (hence the two tests with the predicate Traceable). The challenger provides a re-randomized version of one of them to the adversary, and the latter has to guess which one: it has no bias unless some information leaks in the re-randomized ciphertext. As a consequence, subliminal-channel freeness is quantied by
Mtaes,A (λ) = 1]. We note that for this security notion, the adversary generates the ciphertext itself, and is thus allowed to generate ill-formed ciphertexts, contrarily to the previous security notions. In such a case, only, it wins if it manages to transmit some information. We now provide two additional one that will imply the above ones.
Privacy. This privacy notion (see Fig. 1 (e)) encompasses both semantic security (plaintext-privacy) and anonymity (key-privacy) before re-randomization, and thus even with respect to the mediator:
Ciphertext-Unlinkability. Then, we want that either the pre-ciphertext sent to the mediator has a well identied target recipient, or the re-randomization cancel any information: unless the ciphertext traces back to a user controlled by the adversary, or the re-randomized ciphertext is unlinkable to the input pre-ciphertext, and thus indistinguishable with a truly random ciphertext (in the Real-or-Random sense) (see Fig. 1 
Relations between the Security Notions
In this section, we state that the later security notions imply the former, and the proofs can be found in the Appendix A. 
Theorem 5. For any scheme Mtaes and any time bound τ ,
Our scheme
First, we present a simple scheme achieving the above security requirements. This scheme inherits the properties of some combination of broadcast encryption and re-randomizable techniques. It fullls the strongest properties of privacy and unlinkabillity under the sole DDH assumption, but with the restriction that the same trapdoor is used for both decrypting and tracing ciphertexts. We then show how we can separate these capabilities, under the XDH [5] and the (asymmetric) DBDH [11] assumptions. These classical assumptions are reviewed in the Appendix B. We here use classical advantage notations for all the decisional problems.
Description of the Scheme Mtaes 1
GSetup(λ): The GSetup algorithm takes as input a security parameter λ. It denes a cyclic group G of prime order q, in which the DDH assumption holds, in some basis g. We denote G * = G\{1}, the subset of elements of order exactly q. It chooses random scalars x 1 , . . . , x t ∈ Z * q with t the maximum number of registered users. It sets the master secret key and the opening key as msk = sk O = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x t ) and the group public key mpk = (y 1 = g x 1 , . . . , y t = g xt ). It also sets the registration list L to empty.
Join(id, mpk, msk):
The id is assumed to be an integer between 1 and t. This algorithm thus outputs sk id = x id as the secret key of user id, whereas the public key is y id . It adds the pair (id, pk id = y id ) in the list L.
Encrypt(mpk, i, m):
To encrypt a message m ∈ G under a public key pk i = y i , we choose two random scalars r, s ∈ Z * q and compute
ReRand(mpk, C): To re-randomize a pre-ciphertext in (G * ) 4 , we rst choose 4t random scalars r j , r j and s j , s j in Z * q , for j = 1, · · · , t and compute t sub-ciphertexts as follows:
Then, we obtain a sequence C of t tuples (C 1,j , C 2,j , D 1,j , D 2,j ) for j = 1, . . . , t. Note that the second halves of the tuples allow to re-randomize again the ciphertext, with 4t random scalars a j , a j and b j , b j :
Decrypt(mpk, i, C): To decrypt a ciphertext for user i, using the secret key x i , we compute m ←
1,i . Note that user i can check whether he really is the target recipient:
and check whether g, y i , D 1,i , D 2,i is a DDH-tuple for one of the index i (which would correspond to a registered user in the list L). If such an index is found, we provide a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of validity Π showing the existence of
1,i ; otherwise we output an error symbol ⊥. Note that the same can be done on (g, y i , B 1 , B 2 ) from the pre-ciphertext.
Judge(mpk, L, C, id, Π): This algorithm checks whether the proof Π is valid wrt L, C, id.
Security Analysis
Correctness. First, one should note that after re-randomization, a ciphertext for pk i = y i looks like
where r, s are the random values chosen by the sender, whereas r j , s j and the r j , s j are chosen by the re-randomizer for j = 1, . . . , t. If y i ∈ L, and thus y i = g x i , then
Using the secret key sk i = x i , we immediately get m by computing C 2,i · C
Then, the tuple (C 1,j , C 2,j , D 1,j , D 2,j ) follows a distribution statistically close to random in G 4 , since s and s j are non-zero. It thus contains no information on m and i. We will formally justify that in the following.
Privacy. The privacy property implies both semantic security and anonymity of pre-ciphertexts. We obtain the following result, whose proof can be found in the Appendix C:
Theorem 6. Our scheme Mtaes 1 proposed in Section 3.1 fullls the privacy property under the DDH assumption:
where τ exp denotes an upper bound on the time computation for one exponentiation.
Unlinkability. In order to get the subliminal-channel freeness, we will prove the unlinkability, which holds under the DDH assumption too (the proof can be found in the Appendix C):
Theorem 7. Our scheme Mtaes 1 proposed in Section 3.1 is unlinkable under the DDH assumption:
Two-Level Scheme Mtaes 2
In the previous scheme Mtaes 1 , the same key is used for both the join and the tracing procedures, hence it achieves the weak security level only. In this section, we separate these two capabilities in Mtaes 2 , making use of a so-called Type-2 or Type-3 pairing-friendly structure [13] . It consists in a tuple (G 1 , G 2 , G T , q, e, g 1 , g 2 ) where e is an admissible bilinear map [6] , g 1 , g 2 and G = e (g 1 , g 2 ) are generators of G 1 , G 2 and G T respectively (and additionally there exists an eciently computable isomorphism ψ : G 2 → G 1 in the case of Type-2 structure). We consider structures in which the XDH (i.e. the DDH assumption in G 1 ) and the (asymmetric) DBDH 2 [11] assumptions can be made (e.g., using Weil or Tate pairings on certain MNT curves as dened in [18] , these assumptions seem reasonable).
Description.
GSetup(λ):
The GSetup algorithm takes as input a security parameter λ and generates parameters for a bilinear structure (G 1 , G 2 , G T , q, e, g 1 , g 2 ) As before, the master secret key is set to be a sequence of t random scalars in Z * q , msk = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x t ), and the group public key is dened by
.
The opening key consists of the sequence sk
. This algorithm also sets the registration list L to empty.
Join(id, mpk, msk): As before, this algorithm outputs x id as the secret key sk id of user id, whereas the public key is (y id , Y id ). It also adds the pair (id, pk id = (y id , Y id )) in the list L. (Note that y id would be enough in the public key, and in the master public key, but the use of Y id will simplify the notations).
Encrypt(mpk, i, m):
To encrypt a message m ∈ G T under a public key pk i = (y i , Y i ), one rst chooses two random scalars r, s ∈ Z * q and then computes (
ReRand(mpk, C): To re-randomize a pre-ciphertext, one rst chooses 4t random scalars r j , r j and s j , s j in Z * q for j = 1, · · · , t and computes t sub-ciphertexts as follows:
Then, we obtain a sequence C of t tuples (C 1,j , C 2,j , D 1,j , D 2,j ) for j = 1, . . . , t. Note that the second halves of the tuples allow to re-randomize again the ciphertext, as in Mtaes 1 .
Decrypt(mpk, i, C):
To decrypt a ciphertext for user i, using the secret key x i , we compute m ←
To trace the recipient of a given ciphertext C, check whether
If no such one is found, we output ⊥ otherwise,we provide a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of validity, Π showing the existence of x i ∈ Z q such that h i = g
Security Properties. Granted the richer structure, and both the XDH and the DBDH assumptions, this scheme achieves all the expected security properties: anonymity, indistinguishability (even given access to the opening/tracing key) and unlinkability. The proof can be found in the Appendix D.
2 Our scheme actually relies on a weaker mixed assumption which states that given g 
Protection Against the Issuer
As the Private Key Generator (PKG) in Identity Based-Encryption, the issuer can be involved in malicious activities since it knows all users' registered secret keys. We can easily prevent the issuer from breaking the semantic security of a ciphertext sent to a specic user by rst encrypting the message with an appropriate encryption scheme (for which the issuer does not know the decryption keys) and then reencrypt (component by component) the ciphertext with our mediated traceable anonymous encryption scheme: If the global ciphertext is not traceable, then the underlying ciphertext will be totally random, and thus, no information will be transmitted.
More precisely, for such a technique to be applied with our schemes, we need an underlying ElGamal [12] 
Thereafter, c 1 and c 2 are independently re-encrypted under our Mtaes 1 scheme, using the recipient registered key. One could use another encryption scheme, dierent or stronger than ElGamal. The unique constraint is that the underlying encryption scheme should produce a ciphertext in G k , for some k, so that it can thereafter be re-encrypted by our Mtaes's. In this section, we propose a generic scheme that is ω-resilient, which means that the malicious adversary can corrupt up to a maximum of ω users adaptively and thus possess the ω corresponding private keys. However, it cannot obtain any information relevant to ciphertexts that are encrypted for public keys not within the corrupt users. For a xed ω, our construction is fairly ecient, with ciphertexts that have logarithmic size in the number of group members (instead of linear with the two previous proposals Mtaes 1 and Mtaes 2 ). However, tracing might fail (with small probability, depending on the code).
Our construction relies on well-known tools, namely collusion-secure codes and homomorphic encryption schemes that generalize the protocols from the previous section.
Collusion-secure codes
Our construction makes use of ω-traceable codes [22] , in the same vein as the collusion-secure codes proposed by Boneh and Shaw [7] as a method of digital ngerprinting while preventing a collusion of a specied size ω from framing a user not in the coalition, but furthermore allowing the traceability of a traitor from a word generated by the coalition. We consider a code C of length on an alphabet T , with #T = t (i.e. C ⊆ T ) and we call it an (n, , t)-code if #C = n. The elements of C are called codewords.
For any subset of codewords C 0 ⊂ C, we dene the set of descendants of C 0 (a.k.a. the feasible set), denoted Desc(C 0 ) = {x ∈ T : x i ∈ {a i : a ∈ C 0 }, 1 ≤ i ≤ }. We now recall the following denitions concerning non-frameability and traceability of codes. Let C be an (n, , t)-code and ω any integer such that n > t ≥ ω ≥ 1.
Denition 9. C is an ω-frameproof code if for any subset
Optimal explicit constructions of ω-frameproof codes are known for small coalitions [4] . Wang and Xing [24] provided explicit constructions of ω-frameproof codes based on algebraic curves over nite elds; they obtain innite classes of such (n, , t)-codes with = O(log n) for xed t and ω.
However, a frameproof-code just guarantees that no coalition (not too large) can produce a codeword of a user not in the coalition. But in the ngerprinting setting and for traitor tracing [10] , we furthermore want a tracing algorithm Trace C which, on input a word x generated by the coalition, outputs a member of the coalition C 0 : Denition 10. Let ε > 0. An (n, , ω, t, ε)-collusion-secure code is an (n, , t)-code for which there exists a (probabilistic) tracing algorithm Trace C satisfying the following condition: for any C 0 ⊂ C such that #C 0 ≤ ω, and any x ∈ Desc(C 0 ), Pr[Trace C (x) ∈ C 0 ] > 1 − ε.
Such codes [23] with ecient tracing algorithms have been proposed with = O(log n).
Homomorphic encryption
Homomorphic encryption is a form of encryption where one can perform a group operation on the plaintexts by performing a (possibly dierent) algebraic operation on the ciphertexts. More formally, a Hhomomorphic encryption scheme is a tuple of ecient algorithms (Setup, Kg, Encrypt, , Decrypt) such that (Setup, Kg, Encrypt, Decrypt) is an encryption scheme with message space a group H and is an algorithm (written inx style) that takes two elements in Encrypt's codomain and outputs an element of Encrypt's codomain such that for all messages m, m ∈ H and any matching key pair (pk, sk), we have:
Examples of homomorphic cryptosystems are due to ElGamal [12] , Golwasser-Micali [14] and Paillier [19] . Note that (1) further implies the existence of an ecient function that allows exponentiation of ciphertexts (using a square-and-multiply algorithm): Encrypt(m, pk) r = Encrypt(m, pk) · · · Encrypt(m, pk) (r times). Our construction relies on a pair of encryption schemes that are compatible for two algebraic operations and ⊗ in the following way: Denition 11. Let H 1 and H 2 be two abelian groups of prime order q and let ϕ : H 2 → H 1 be a group homomorphism. A (H 1 , H 2 , ϕ)-compatible encryption scheme is a tuple of (probabilistic) polynomial-time algorithms (Setup, Kg, Encrypt 1 , Encrypt 2 , ,⊗, Decrypt 1 , Decrypt 2 ) such that: Setup(λ) → params: this algorithm is run by a (trusted) party that, on input of a security parameter λ, produces a set params of common public parameters.
Kg(params) → (pk, sk (1) , sk (2) ): on input of public parameters params, all parties use this randomized algorithm to generate a private/public key pair (pk, sk (1) , sk (2) ). We denote Kg i for i ∈ {1, 2} the algorithm that executes Kg but only returns (pk, sk (i) ).
(Setup, Kg 1 , Encrypt 1 , Decrypt 1 ) is an encryption scheme with message space H 1 .
(Setup, Kg 2 , Encrypt 2 , , Decrypt 2 ) is a H 2 -homomorphic encryption scheme, but for which we ask for the decryption algorithm to output ϕ(m) ∈ H 1 only (and not m ∈ H 2 itself).
⊗ is an algorithm (written inx style) that on input an Encrypt 1 -ciphertext and an Encrypt 2 -ciphertext outputs an Encrypt 1 -ciphertext such that for all messages m 1 ∈ H 1 and m 2 ∈ H 2 and any matching key pair (pk, sk (1) , sk (2) ), we have:
Remark 12. Any G-homomorphic encryption gives rise to a (H 1 = G, H 2 = G, id)-compatible encryption scheme in the trivial way (i.e. with ⊗ = ). In a bilinear structure BS = (G 1 , G 2 , G T , q, e, g 1 , g 2 ), a non-straightforward (H 1 = G T , H 2 = G 1 , ϕ : y → e (y, g 2 ))-compatible encryption scheme is the one we implicitly use in the construction of the scheme Mtaes 2 (see the Appendix D):
Setup generates the parameters for an appropriate bilinear structure
where g 1 , g 2 and G = e (g 1 , g 2 ) are generators of G 1 , G 2 and G T respectively;
Kg picks at random a scalar x ∈ Z * q and outputs a triple (pk, sk
(Setup, Kg 2 , Encrypt 2 , , Decrypt 2 ) is the ElGamal encryption scheme in the group G 1 : it performs the encryption of m ∈ G 1 as C = (c 1 , c 2 ) = (m · pk r , g r 1 ) ∈ G 2 1 , for a random r R ← Z * q , and the knowledge of sk (2) allows to recover ϕ(m) ∈ G T from C as: ϕ(m) = e (c 1 , g 2 ) /e c 2 , sk (2) . The operation is the component-wise product in G 2 1 .
(Setup, Kg 1 , Encrypt 1 , Decrypt 1 ) is the ElGamal encryption scheme in the group G T with public key Y = e (pk, g 2 ) = ϕ(pk);
The operation ⊗ : G 2
Notation. Let H be a nite group. We denote Split H the probabilistic algorithm that on input m ∈ H and ≥ 1, picks uniformly at For an encryption scheme (Setup, Kg, Encrypt, Decrypt) with domain H, we denote Encrypt ( ) the algorithm that takes as input m = (m 1 , . . . , m ) ∈ H and pk = (pk 1 , . . . , pk ) and returns the vector c = Encrypt(m, pk) dened as the coordinate-wise encryption of m under the public-key pk. Similarly, we denote Decrypt ( ) the algorithm that given a vector of ciphertexts c and a vector of secret keys sk = (sk 1 , . . . , sk ), parses c as c = (c 1 , . . . , c ) (where each c i is a ciphertext), outputs ⊥ if Decrypt(c i , sk i ) = ⊥ for some i ∈ {1, . . . , } and i=1 Decrypt(c i , sk i ) ∈ H, otherwise. In particular, for any vector of matching key pairs (pk, sk), for any m ∈ H, and any integer ≥ 1, we have:
If (Setup, Kg, Encrypt, Decrypt) is a H-homomorphic encryption scheme, we denote the coordinatewise product dened on the codomain of Encrypt ( ) . If (Setup, Kg, Encrypt 1 , Encrypt 2 , , ⊗, Decrypt 1 , Decrypt 2 ) is a (H 1 , H 2 , ϕ)-compatible encryption scheme, we also denote ⊗ the coordinate-wise operation dened on the cartesian product of the Encrypt 
Description of the Scheme Mtaes 3
Let ≥ 1 be an integer, let H 1 and H 2 be two abelian groups of prime order q and let the map ϕ : H 2 → H 1 be a group homomorphism. Let the system (Setup, Kg, Encrypt 1 , Encrypt 2 , , ⊗, Decrypt 1 , Decrypt 2 ) be a (H 1 , H 2 , ϕ)-compatible encryption scheme and C a (n, , ω, t, ε)-collusion-secure code of length on the alphabet T = {1, . . . , t}. The following construction describes the generic scheme Mtaes 3 :
GSetup(λ): The GSetup algorithm takes as input a security parameter λ. It executes Setup(λ) and given the common public parameters params, it runs t times Kg(params) and gets t triples (pk i,j , sk (1) i,j , sk (2) i,j ) for (i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , } × {1, . . . , t}. It sets the group public key, the opening key and the master secret key:
1,1 sk (2) 1,2 . . . sk ,1 sk
1,1 sk (1) 1,2 . . . sk ,1 sk
It also outputs the registration list L that is initially empty.
Join(id, mpk, msk):
This algorithm encodes the id into the public key,
where for each i, c i ∈ {1, . . . , t}, and outputs sk
,c ) the secret key of user id. It furthermore adds the pair (id, pk id ) in the list L.
Encrypt(mpk, c, m):
To encrypt a message m ∈ H 1 under a public key pk id = c, the algorithm
, pk c ) where pk c = (pk 1,c 1 , . . . , pk ,c ) and outputs C = (A, B) .
ReRand(mpk, C): To re-randomize a pre-ciphertext C = (A, B) , the algorithm picks at random t vectors r j , s j ∈ (Z * q ) for j ∈ {1, . . . , t}, generates u = Split H 2 (1, ) and v = Split H 2 (1, ) and computes t vectors of ciphertexts as follows:
for j ∈ {1, . . . , t} and pk j = (pk 1,j , . . . , pk ,j ). It outputs the 2t vector C = (C 1 , . . . , C t , D 1 , . . . , D t ).
Decrypt(mpk, i, C):
To decrypt a ciphertext C = (C 1 , . . . , C t , D 1 , . . . , D t ) for the public key pk c , using the secret key sk (1) c , the algorithm computes Decrypt (C 1,c 1 , . . . , C ,c ), sk Remark 13. If we instantiate the scheme Mtaes 1 3 with the ElGamal homomorphic encryption scheme in a group G (resp. with the (G T , G 1 , ϕ : y → e(y, g 2 ))-compatible encryption scheme in a bilinear structure (G 1 , G 2 , G T , q, e, g 1 , g 2 ), described in Remark 12) and the code C = {1, . . . , t} = T , we obtain the scheme Mtaes 1 (resp. the scheme Mtaes 2 ) described in the Section 3.
Security Analysis
Let us explain why this scheme works, and which security level it provides.
Correctness. Since 
The extracted ciphertext (C 1,c 1 , . . . , C ,c ) is A ⊗ (B r Encrypt ( ) (u, pk c )) with r = (r c 1 , . . . , r c ) and
Note that because of the code, tracing may fail with some small probability ε.
Semantic Security and Privacy. We now prove that if the basic construction Mtaes 1 3 is semantically secure (resp. anonymous or private) then for any integer ≥ 1 and any ω-collusion secure code C, the scheme Mtaes 3 is ω-resilient semantically secure (resp. ω-resilient anonymous or ω-resilient private). Theorem 14. Let ≥ 1 be an integer and let C be an (n, , ω, t, ε)-secure code. Our scheme Mtaes 3 fullls the ω-resilient (strong) semantic security property if and only if our scheme Mtaes 1 3 fullls the (strong) semantic security property:
where τ Kg denotes an upper bound on the time computation for execution of the Kg algorithm.
Proof. Let us consider an adversary A against the ω-resilient (strong) semantic security of Mtaes 3 . We construct an adversary B against the (strong) semantic security of Mtaes 1 3 . Key Generation. The adversary B simulates the GSetup algorithm by using params, the common parameters received from its own challenger as the common parameters given to A. In addition, B receives from its challenger a list of public keys (pk 1 , . . . , pk ) as well as the second-level matching secret keys (sk (2) 1 , . . . , sk (2) ) for the scheme Mtaes 1 3 . The algorithm then uniformly picks at random a vector (a 1 , . . . , a ) ∈ C ⊂ {1, . . . , t} and sets (pk i,a i , sk
i ) for i ∈ {1, . . . , }. It then executes (t − 1) times the key generation algorithm Kg(λ) and gets (t − 1) triples (pk i,j , sk (1) i,j , sk (2) i,j ), for (i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , } × {1, . . . , t} but j = a i . It sets the group public key, the opening key and the master secret key as in the real scheme. The algorithm B runs A on input params, mpk and sk O .
Join
* and Corrupt Queries. When A asks a Join * query for user j, B encodes the id into the public key,
where c i ∈ {1, . . . , t}. It furthermore adds the pair (id, pk id ) in the list L.
When A asks a Corrupt query for user j with identity id = c, B outputs (sk (1) 1 , . . . , sk (1) ) possibly by asking to its own Corrupt oracle the keys sk
it does not know. It furthermore adds the pair (id, pk id ) in the list C. If the adversary A wants to corrupt player (a 1 , . . . , a ), then B aborts. Otherwise, thanks to the ω-collusion security of the code C, we know the ω corruptions cannot involve all the coordinates of the challenge code (a 1 , . . . , a ), otherwise the latter would be in the feasible set, which would contradict the frameproof-property: B will query its Corrupt oracle at most − 1 times. Then, pk I has not been corrupted, for some index I.
Challenge Ciphertext. Eventually, A outputs a public key pk id and two messages m 0 and m 1 (and possibly some state information s). With probability greater than 1/n (which automatically includes the fact that (a 1 , . . . , a ) has not been asked as a Corrupt-query), we have id = (a 1 , . . . , a ). If this is not the case, B aborts. As said above, we know that sk has not been queried to B's Corrupt oracle. The algorithm B then computes u = (u 1 , . . . , u ) = Split H 1 (1, ) and for j ∈ {1, . . . , } \ {I}, c j = Encrypt 1 (u j , pk a j ). It then sends to its own challenger (pk I = pk a I , u I · m 0 , u I · m 1 ) and receives the encryption c I of u I m b for a random b ∈ {0, 1} under the public key pk I . The algorithm B sends c = (c 1 , . . . , c ) to A. This is a valid encryption of m b : A outputs a bit b that B forwards to its own challenger.
Conclusion. Globally, the running time of B is the same as A (and the real challenger) plus the time to execute (t − 1) times Kg and its success probability is identical to the one of A when the guess for (a 1 , . . . , a ) has been correct (which happens with probability greater than 1/n). This concludes the proof of (strong) semantic security.
Theorem 15. Let ≥ 1 be an integer and let C be an (n, , ω, t, ε)-secure code. Our scheme Mtaes 3 fullls the ω-resilient privacy property if and only if our scheme Mtaes 1 3 fullls the privacy property
Proof (Sketch). The proof is very close to the previous one. In the Challenge ciphertext phase, the adversary A outputs a tuple (pk 0 , pk 1 , m 0 , m 1 , s), and we know that the two (which are possibly the same) public keys are not corrupted. Again, still with probability greater than 1/n, the above simulation worked and there is I such that pk a I has not been queried to B's Corrupt oracle.
This theorem implies the anonymity property.
Unlinkability. Finally, we also state that if the basic construction Mtaes 1 3 is unlinkable then for any integer ≥ 1 and any ω-secure code C the scheme Mtaes 3 is ω-resilient unlinkable. The proof can be found in the Appendix E. 
A.1 Enhanced Security Notions
Chosen-Ciphertext. To address chosen-ciphertext attacks, we have to provide the adversary with a decryption oracle. But due to the inherent malleability of such a re-randomizable encryption scheme, some constraints will be added, in the same vein as RCCA denition [8] , with some forbidden requests (answered by Test):
Decrypt * (P, (id, C)) → {m, ⊥}, takes as input a list P = {(id i , C i )} of critical pairs, a registered identity id and a ciphertext C, it runs Decrypt(mpk, sk id , C) to get either m, or ⊥ in case of invalid ciphertext. In the latter case, ⊥ is returned. Otherwise, it furthermore runs Decrypt(mpk, sk id i , C i ) for all the pairs in P to get either m i or ⊥. If for some index i, m i = m, then it outputs Test, otherwise m is the output.
The restrictions, without which attacks cannot be avoided, are the following ones:
for the semantic security, we set P = {(pk, C * )}; for the anonymity, there is not restriction; for privacy, we set P = {(pk 0 , C * ), (pk 1 , C * )}; for both unlinkability and subliminal-channel freeness, we have P = LU × {C * }.
Full Anonymity. To address full-anonymity, we have to provide the adversary with an opening oracle. But against, because of the inherent malleability, some constraints will be added, with some forbidden requests (answered by Test):
Open * (P, C) → {pk, ⊥}, takes as input a list P = {C i } of critical ciphertexts and a ciphertext C, it runs Trace(mpk, sk O , L, C) to get either pk, or ⊥ in case of invalid ciphertext. In the latter case, ⊥ is returned. Otherwise, it furthermore runs Trace(mpk, sk O , L, C i ) for all the ciphertexts in P to get either pk i or ⊥. If for some index i, pk i = pk, then it outputs Test, otherwise pk is the output.
for the semantic security, there is no restriction; for the anonymity, we set P = {C * }; for privacy, we set P = {C * }; for both unlinkability and subliminal-channel freeness, we have P = {C * }.
A.2 Proofs of the Relations between Security Notions
Proof (of Theorem 4). Let us rst show that the privacy implies both weak semantic security (without the opening key) and anonymity:
let A be an adversary with advantage ε against weak semantic security. We describe an adversary let A be an adversary with advantage ε against anonymity. We describe an adversary B against privacy, the same way as above, but duplicating the plaintext instead of the public key.
For the other direction, we use the hybrid technique, for any adversary A against the privacy security notion, with running time bounded by τ . But we could extend this privacy game with two random bits b and c, where b species the message to be encrypted (as in the semantic security game) and c the target public key (as in the anonymity game): Our rst proposal relies on the classical DDH assumption only. Our second proposal Mtaes 2 requires the XDH and a new assumption weaker than the widely used (asymmetric) DBDH assumptions.
Denition 17 (Decisional Die-Hellman Assumption DDH). Let G be a cyclic group of prime order q. The DDH assumption in basis g states that the distributions of the tuples (g x , g y , g xy ) and (g x , g y , g z ) for random scalars x, y, z in Z q are computationally indistinguishable.
Denition 18 (External Die-Hellman Assumption XDH). Let G 1 , G 2 and G T be three cyclic groups of prime order q, with an admissible (which means non-degenerate and eciently computable) bilinear map e : Proof (of Theorem 6). Consider an adversary A against the privacy of our rst scheme, we will construct an adversary B against the 2-DDH problem: This is a simple variant of the DDH-problem in basis g, where an instance is a 5-tuple (g x , g y , g z , gȳ, gz), and one has to decide whether both z = xy andz = xȳ, or both z andz are random. Using an hybrid argument, one easily gets that Adv
where τ exp is the time to compute an exponentiation in G.
Let g be any generator of G, and we have to guess at least one of the players that will not be corrupted: we choose an index I at random: we are given a 2-DDH instance (U = g u , V = g v , Z = g z ,V = gv,Z = gz),
When A asks a Join * query for user j, we output the public key pk j = y j . When A asks a Corrupt query for user j, we output sk = x j . With probability greater than 1/t, there is no problem here, otherwise, we abort (if the adversary wants to corrupt player I).
Then, the adversary outputs a tuple (pk i 0 , pk i 1 , m 0 , m 1 , s), and we know that the two (which are possibly the same) public keys are not corrupted. Again, still with probability greater than 1/t, the above simulation worked (no corruption of player I) and there is d such that pk i d = y I = U . The random choice of d is equivalent to the above random choice of I, if i 0 = i 1 , we thus either choose an additional random bit d (if i 0 = i 1 ), or set d so that pk i d = y I = U , and dene the challenge ciphertext as described below: Globally, the running time of B is the same as A and the real challenger, when the 2-DDH instance is given, but when the guess for I has been correct only, which happens with probability greater than 1/t. This concludes the proof of privacy.
C.2 Unlinkability of Mtaes 1
Proof (of Theorem 7). We consider an adversary that tries to transfer some information in a ciphertext that does not trace back to any corrupted key. We will show that after re-randomization, any pre-ciphertext (or even a ciphertext already re-randomized) that does not trace back to any corrupted y i leads to a randomly looking tuple in G 4t .
Two cases can appear: the ciphertext provided by the adversary traces back to none of the t keys, or it traces back to an honest user. We are given a 2-DDH tuple (U = g u , V = g v , Z = g z ,V = gv,Z = gz), and we choose a random index I between 1 and t + 1, in which to inject the DDH tuple. The case t + 1 means that we do not inject it, and thus we bet that the ciphertext will trace back to nobody.
As in the previous proof, we set mpk = (y 1 ← g x 1 , y 2 = g x 2 , · · · , y I = U, · · · , y t = g xt ) for random scalars x i R ← Z q . When the adversary A asks a Join * query for user j, we output pk j ← y j = g x j . When A asks a Corrupt query for user j, we output sk j ← x j . We recall that L is the list of all the registered keys/users, and C the list of the corrupted keys/users. When A outputs his target ciphertext
we know (or assume) that it does not trace back to any corrupted user: d = xc, with x ∈ L\C. We now re-rerandomize it:
where
, which can be seen as four independent random variables, when i = I. As a consequence, for any i = I, the tuple (
, independently of other tuples. Which means that if I > t, the ciphertext C is randomly distributed in G 4t . However, if I ≤ t, which means that the adversary tries to transfer some information in a ciphertext that traces back an honest user: the re-randomized line I is
where c I = cr I + v and d I = cs I +v. In the case of a real 2-DDH tuple, this is a real re-randomization, with r I = v and s i =v. But under the DDH assumption, this is indistinguishable to the situation where we have a random 2-DDH tuple, and in such a case,
where r = z − uv andr =z − uv, which are two random scalars. This line is also a truly random tuple in
With such a random 2-DDH instance as input, our re-randomization of C is perfectly indistinguishable from a truly random ciphertext in G 4t . Hence the view of the adversary is perfectly independent of the bit b involved in the unlinkability game. Globally, the running time of our simulator is the same as A and the real challenger, when the 2-DDH instance is given, but when the guess for I has been correct only, which happens with probability greater than 1/(t + 1). This concludes the proof of unlinkability. Proof (of Theorem 8). All the previous results for Mtaes 1 still hold for Mtaes 2 , since without the tracing key, everything can be done with elements in G 1 . We just have to prove that we can reveal the tracing keys for the indistinguishability. Let us thus show how we can initialize the simulation in this particular case, in a bilinear setting BS = (G 1 , G 2 , G T , q, e, g 1 , g 2 ). We consider an adversary A against indistinguishability, and we construct an adversary B against the DMBDH problem: given a tuple (U 1 = g u 1 , U 2 = g u 2 , V = G v , Z = G z ), we set: mpk = (g 1 , g 2 , G, (y 1 = g . When A asks a Join * query for user j, we output the public key pk j = (y j , Y j ). When A asks a Corrupt query for user j, we output sk = x j . Then, the adversary outputs a tuple (pk, m 0 , m 1 , s), and we assume that pk = pk I . We choose a random bit d, and dene the challenge ciphertext Globally, the running time of B is the same as A and the real challenger, when the DMBDH instance is given, but when the guess for I has been correct only, which happens with probability greater than 1/t. This concludes the proof of indistinguishability.
E Unlinkability of Mtaes 3
Proof (of Theorem 16). Consider an adversary A against the ω-resilient unlinkability of Mtaes 3 , we construct an adversary B against the unlinkability of Mtaes 1 3 . Key Generation. The adversary B simulates the GSetup algorithm by using params the common parameters received from its own challenger as the common parameters given to A. In addition, B receives from its challenger a list of public key (pk 1 , . . . , pk ) for the scheme Mtaes 3 (1).
The algorithm picks then uniformly at random a vector (a 1 , . . . , a ) ∈ C ⊂ {1, . . . , t} and sets (pk i,a i , sk (1) i,a i , sk (2) i,a i ) = (pk i , ⊥, ⊥) for i ∈ {1, . . . , }. It then executes (t − 1) times Kg(λ) and gets (t − 1) triples (pk i,j , sk (1) i,j , sk (2) i,j ) for (i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , } × {1, . . . , t} with j = a i . It sets the group public key, the opening key and the master secret key as in the real scheme. The algorithm B runs A on input params and mpk.
Join
* and Corrupt Queries. When A asks a Join * query for user j, B encodes the id into the public key, pk id = c = (c 1 c 2 . . . c ) ∈ C, where c i ∈ {1, . . . , t}. It furthermore adds the pair (id, pk id ) in the list L.
When A asks a Corrupt query for user j with identity id = c, B outputs (sk
1 , . . . , sk
t ) possibly by asking to its own Corrupt oracle the keys sk (1) i,a i it does not know. It furthermore adds the pair (id, pk id ) in the list C.
If the adversary A wants to corrupt player (a 1 , . . . , a ), then B aborts. As in the previous proof, thanks to the ω-frameproof property of the code C, we know that there is a pk I , for some index I that has not been corrupted. Challenge Ciphertext. Eventually, A outputs a ciphertext C = (A, B) (and possibly some state information s). As said above, we know that sk (1) I,a I has not been queried to B's Corrupt oracle. The adversary B sends C I = (A I , B I ) to its own challenger (which is therefore by denition a non-traceable ciphertext). It receives C I = (A 1 , . . . , A t , B 1 , . . . , B t ) that is either a re-randomization of C I or a truly random ciphertext.
The adversary then applies the re-randomization procedure of Mtaes 3 to the ciphertext C = (A, B) in the following way: it picks at random t vectors r j , s j ∈ (Z * q ) for j ∈ {1, . . . , t}, then generates u = Split H 2 (1, ) and v = Split H 2 (1, ). It computes t vectors of ciphertexts as follows: for j ∈ {1, . . . , t} and pk j = (pk 1,j , . . . , pk ,j ). The algorithm B then replaces, for j ∈ {1, . . . , t}, the value C j,i and D j,i by: C I,j ← A I ⊗ Encrypt 2 (u I , pk I,j ) D I,j ← B I Encrypt 2 (v I , pk I,j ).
It outputs the 2t vector C = (C 1 , . . . , C t , D 1 , . . . , D t ). It is readily seen that if C is a valid rerandomization of C i = (A i , B i ), then C is a valid re-randomization of C. However, if C is a random
